Cardinal Sin: Should the Red Birds Already be Regretting the DeRosa Deal?

Contributor: Seamus

Trade deadline week is upon us, and I have but one question. Is it fair to laud one deal, while retroactively panning another, knowing that the lack of early returns from the former likely led directly led to the consummation of the latter? The answer is probably 'no,' regardless, the fact remains that the Cardinals have gutted their farm system in recent weeks, parting with five of their top 10-12 prospects in order to snag Mark DeRosa from Cleveland and Matt Holliday from Oakland. What's more, these moves could be considered highly redundant given the resources at St. Louis' disposal. Although the ultimate success of each deal will not be known for some time (years in Cleveland and Oakland's cases, several months in St. Louis'), an early assessment smiles on the Holliday swap for the Cards, while frowning heavily on the DeRosa prospect heist. What follows are comments on the five ex-Cardinals prospects recently shipped out of town:

 
* To Cleveland, for Mark DeRosa:

Chris Perez (STL): 1-1, 4.94 ERA, 11.03 SO/9 over 31 IP, WHIP 1.29

A brazenly cocky kid with a heavy 95-98 mph heater and a biting, low-eighties slider, Perez should continue to yield BAA numbers in the sub-.220 range for years to come. Already in the majors, Perez thus represents a superb pickup for the relief-starved Indians, and a particularly painful loss for the Cardinals, who seem to have forgotten the first eleven years of Ryan Franklin's career. Though Perez cannot effectively command his off-speed repertoire (yet)--characteristic of many young fireballers who were able to ride an unhittable fastball through the minor league ranks--he has the look of a future closer, and could've been the Cardinals #1 fireman come October.

Jess Todd (AAA): 4-2, 2.20 ERA, 59 SO/13 BB in 49.0 IP (10.84 SO/9 vs. 2.39 BB/9), WHIP 1.06, 24 SV

The Cardinals had to be hoping that Todd wasn't the player-to-be-named-later in the DeRosa deal...but they also had to be expecting it. An extremely refined Arkansas product, Todd is not capable of overpowering hitters to the degree that Perez is, but he is light years ahead of Perez with his command. A starter in the minor leagues, Todd projects most favorably as a bullpen arm in the major leagues; a solid 5'11", 210 pounder, he is the kind of relief-ace that could give a team two or three solid innings in a close game if any manager were audacious enough to use him as such. Featuring a low-to-mid nineties sinking fastball, a cutter and a sharp slider, all of which he can locate on either side of the plate, Todd may well become the best arm included in this deal. What's more, he too could likely have helped the Cardinal's bullpen this year (despite a rough debut), especially if he continues to show progress in commanding a rapidly developing change, the only thing that delayed his promotion for three months.

** To Oakland, for Matt Holliday:

Brett Wallace (AA/AAA): .289/.367/.427, 103 H, 27 XBH (16 HR), 35 RBI, 45 R

An extremely balanced hitter with a level swing and a superior eye, Wallace has the uncanny ability to square up almost anything and, in the process, spray line drives all over the field. Although this has not yet led to lofty home run numbers, and likely never will if he remains in Oakland, Wallace still projects as a solid middle-of-the order bat, one that can produce oodles of doubles as well as high batting and on-base averages. He is thus of the same ilk as former-Athletic's 1B Scott Hatteberg, who could represent a reasonable statistical approximation for a young Wallace (though I expect the two-time PAC-10 triple crown winner to display greater power production at some point). Defensively, Wallace is startlingly adequate, despite some of the girthiest thighs you will ever find at the hot corner. (*side note: A pillar of "Moneyball" is the identification of players who--because of their physique, or some other attributes extraneous to pure baseball skill--have had their finer qualities as a ballplayer obscured in the eyes of scouts and executives. In essence, it is the ongoing search for Brett Wallaces of one type or another. This made it all the more shocking when Billy Beane passed on Wallace in last year's draft, opting instead for “toolsy” Miami 2B Jemile Weeks (Wallace would go with the next pick, #13 overall, to St. Louis). Now that order has been restored and Beane has his man, a shift to 1B is imminent, and an ascension to moneyball posterboy is overwhelmingly likely, particularly if Wallace can return the A's to their winning ways and--in doing so--restore Beane's tarnished "genius" status.)

Clayton Mortensen (AAA): 7-6, 4.37 ERA, 7.03 K/9 vs. 2.91 BB/9 in 105 IP, 1.30 WHIP

Featuring a sinking low-nineties fastball that is death to right-handed hitters, this 2007 sandwich pick was an interesting inclusion from the A's perspective. Though Mortensen struggled mightily against lefties last season (.354 BAA), improved command (particularly of his circle change) has alleviated some of these concerns; Mortensen thus appears ready to step into a big league rotation, or at least to step into a bullpen as a righty specialist or mop-up man. Neither of these areas is an Oakland "need," in fact the A's are bubbling over with big-league ready arms. As such, it would've seemed more prudent to go after a higher-ceiling prospect farther down the developmental ladder, perhaps still in single-A. Unless Mortensen turns a major corner, and there is little evidence to indicate he will, he projects as a back-of-the-rotation groundball specialist with a disturbing penchant for giving up big flies. Oakland already features four rookies in their rotation: Brett Anderson, Trevor Cahill, Vin Mazarro and Gio Gonzalez; with Justin Duchsherer set to return soon, this is more-or-less a rotation in itself. Even in the increasingly likely case that Gonzalez does not pan out, it would not be difficult to complete an effective big league staff with one member of the their stable of youthful veterans, Dallas Braden, Dana Eveland and possibly even Faustino de los Santos, should he successfully rebound from TJ surgery. Given this assemblage, and even with the possibility of further trades involving Duchsherer, Eveland and/or Braden, where is the need for Mortensen? It would seem that he would be of much greater value to St. Louis, making his inclusion a quite peculiar decision on both ends.

Shane Peterson (HiA/AA): .293/.357/.420, 108 H, 28 XBH (16 2B, 5 3B, 7 HR), 47 RBI, 43 R, 12 SB in 13 A

Another prospect who has elicited a variety of opinions, Peterson has impressed many by reaching double-A in his first full professional season, though concerns about his defense and his "front-foot hitting style" have led to tempered optimism amongst many scouts as well. A below-average runner whose base-stealing prowess is likely a facade, Peterson has the frame of a power-hitter at the next level, and has shown enough in his first pro season to suggest he has at least a Jason Michaels-esque future to look forward to. While this is certainly not All-Star caliber production, it is periodic productivity given the right situation. That is, more times than not his performance will warrant a starting position, or at least a platoon gig, at the big-league level. That said, I personally have no problem with his inclusion in the deal, as the Cardinals have no shortage of outfield bats, and Peterson is widely considered the "fringiest" prospect on this list.

*** The science of prognostication is--in actuality--anything but; it's a crapshoot at best. Still, these are not 17 year-old signings out of the Dominican Republic we're talking about...of the five prospects in the two deals, three of them have already sniffed big-league action, and another (Wallace) is primed for a September call-up. These are players with extensive college and minor league track records, already knocking down the proverbial big league door. As such, the act of projecting their performances becomes a considerably more-accurate affair.

Mark DeRosa appears to be heating up, posting hits (including a homer) in a three-game weekender with the Phils. Additionally, he gives the Cardinals a degree of versatility they previously lacked, as he can adequately fill in at first, second, third or either corner outfield position (though he is only a modest upgrade over Skip Schumaker, offensively or defensively, despite Schumaker grading out as the major's worst defensive 2B by UZR). Additionally, with the coaching staff seemingly intent on letting Rick Ankiel hit his way through his season-long slump, this leaves the Cardinals with more-than-enough outfielders to relegate DeRosa to exclusive infield duty (see: Holliday, Ludwick, Rasmus, Ankiel, Glaus[?]). In a perfect world, where DeRosa remained an adequate defensive second baseman and Glaus could return to regular duty at third, the odd men out would be Ankiel (with Schumaker assuming 4th OF responsibilities) and current-3B Joe Thurston; in actuality, the Cards might have to settle for DeRosa booting the abhorrently ineffective Thurston to the waiver wire, while Schumaker continues to do his Chuck Knoblauch thing at second. This leaves Ankiel as the forth outfielder, with a gimpy Glaus assuming pinch-hitting responsibilities, or possibly DH'ing should the opportunity present itself.

So is an upgrade from Thurston to DeRosa worth the hefty price of Perez and Todd? Thurston has certainly held up his end, grading out as one of the very worst regulars in the national league. He also makes a convincing argument for the dubious distinction of "biggest hole in a contender's lineup," as attested by a .229 BA and .669 OPS (though he has his work cut out for him if he wishes to catch Emilio Bonafacio or any of the Twins' middle infield contingent). Either way, the frightening possibility remains that Thurston will simply scoot over, taking AB's away from Schumaker as his backup at second; Cardinal fans should pray this responsibility falls instead to Julio Lugo, who--for all his defensive shortcomings at the keystone--remains a productive middle-IF bat. Assuming DeRosa effectively purges the Cards lineup of Thurston, his healthy .807 OPS (17 HR) should be worth a win or two going forward, not a bad investment in a tight N.L. Central race. However, the Cardinals bullpen, featuring Franklin, Kyle McClellan, Trever Miller and Dennys "The Big Sweat" Reyes, will also be tested down the stretch, and they're going to need more innings than those four arms can provide going forward (especially with La Rusa's well-known penchant for frequent pitching changes). This presents a problem, as Jason Motte (5.70 ERA) has been less-than-inspiring, youngster Blake Hawksworth was hit extremely hard in his last appearance (vs. PHI), and the 36 year-old Franklin (career 4.10 ERA) is unlikely to continue his Mo Rivera act all season.

So will the extra offensive production provided by DeRosa (above that expected from Thurston, Glaus and/or Khalil Greene) be enough to offset the subtraction of Perez and Todd from an unproven 'pen? My early guess would by no; the Cardinals would have been better off holding onto the arms, mixing and matching Ryan, Greene, Lugo and Schumaker (at second, short and third), and waiting for Glaus to return. The Cardinals guessed differently, or perhaps did not view the acquisition of Holliday as realistic at the time of the DeRosa move. Either way, whether this move will be viewed as shrewd success or crippling miscalculation will be determined, at least in-part, by the happenings of the next two months...let's sit back and let the dog days sort it out.

I Think Leon Kass May Have Just Made an Insightful Observation...

Contributor: Migs

Nevermind.

To All You Royals Fans Out There, Dayton Moore Would Like to Say, "Go Fuck Yourselves"

Contributor: Wally

Moving on...Dayton Moore is at it again.  For those of you who thought he couldn't top the Mike Jacobs trade (in which he surrendered Leo Nunez, now a candidate for the Marlin's closer position), enter Yuniesky Betancourt.

I would have really liked to rail on this move, but I was stripped of any incentive after Joe Posanski, brilliant columnist for the KC Star, spent about 9,000 words doing it better than I ever could have.  Here are some of the highlights, Joe Po italicized: 

"A few years ago, the Royals traded Jermaine Dye for Yuniesky-comp Neifi Perez. Now, that trade was an absolute disaster — the worst in team history in my opinion — but there was this indisputable line of reasoning. The Royals felt like they did not have a shortstop ready to play in the big leagues. This is a powerful problem: When you play baseball, you must have a shortstop … otherwise teams will laugh at you. Yes, true, they will laugh at you if you have Neifi Perez at shortstop too, but they’ll laugh at you more if you don’t have a shortstop at all."

And if you field a team that includes Yuniesky Betancourt, Willie Bloomquist, Mike Jacobs, Jose Guillen, Miggy Olivo and one of the Luis Hernandez/Tony Pena Jr. contingent, opposing teams run the risk of shitting themselves before they take the field. 

Let me preface this next one by saying that Yuniesky's last two UZR's (2008, 2009) were: -12.6, -8.3, his Dewan Plus/Minus: -19/-13...Joe Po, GO!!! 

"Yuniesky Betancourt is--by these numbers--a LEGENDARILY BAD defensive shortstop.  No, really, legendarily, like in 300 years kids will be sitting around campfires singing about how bad a shortstop Yuniesky Betancourt was."

Wow.  I had always assumed, as Joe Po and many others no doubt had, that Yunieksy was an above-average ML shortstop.  I'd seen a number of highlight reel plays (always to his backhand side, allowing him to flaunt a cannon arm from shallow left field) and he seemed to fit the stereotype of the no-bat, defensive-minded SS.  Perhaps most importantly, I haven't seen a whole lot of M's baseball the last couple of years.  Thankfully. 

"The Royals have now acquired four — count them FOUR — players off the 2005 Seattle Mariners. They’ve got Meche, Bloomquist, Miguel Olivo and Betancourt. It’s like they are trying to rebuild that 69-93 team brick-by-brick. Call Richie Sexson’s agent!" 

Well said, sir.  By the way, the roster of the '05 M's also included--at one time or another--Ichiro, Raul Ibanez, Adrian Beltre, Randy Winn, Jamie Moyer, Joel Piniero, Ryan Franklin, J.J. Putz, Matt Thornton, Eddie Guardado, Rafael Soriano, George Sherill, Jose Lopez, Shin-Soo Choo, Yorvit Torrealba and Felix Hernandez.  All of these players, at one point or another, have either (a) played at an All-Star calliber level or (b) played at a high enough level [superficially] to fool an All-Star manager into giving them a place on an All-Star team.  All of this is, at least in part, a testament to the ability of the '05 M's front office to identify talent...they had a ton of it, and even turned some of it into useful pieces (for example, Sherill was included in the Bedard trade, though All-Star CF Adam Jones and Future's Game starter Chris Tillman were also surrendered).  Think we're gonna be able to throw around such accolades looking back at the '09 Royals team?

In other news, the Red Sox cut ties with a far superior player today, Julio Lugo, he of a perplexing -43.2 UZR.  (That's negative, folks.  And while astute observers will point out that this is an anomaly attributable to a small sample size, it is nevertheless an abominable performance over any period.)  In a phone conversation with Steve Buckley, Lugo explained his predicament: "When you see a good looking girl, you get married and sometimes things don't work out.  I gave it my best and unfortunately things didn't work out."  Fellas, I know you can't wait to marry every good-looking girl that comes into your life...right?  Well don't, dipshits, or you could end up with the marriage equivalent of a .284/.352/.367 line, undoubtedly grounds for divorce in 2009 American culture.

Is Alfonso Soriano's the Worst Contract in Baseball? (Popping the proverbial Zito of common knowledge on bad deals)

Contributor: Bombykol

Alfonso Soriano's current contract runs 8 years and will pay him $136 million...no kidding.  To you non-Cubs fans out there who want to understand what it feels like to have such an albatross on your roster, try repeatedly slamming your testicles with a car door.  While staggering at first glance, Soriano's contract was not an isolated faux pas in an otherwise discriminating environment.  Riding the coat-tails of a season that shattered the previous MLB attendance record, the free-agent market of 2006 was both rabid and ridiculously detatched from any reasonable method of player valuation.  And not just for perceived "stars," either; in the two-year period from '06 to '07, $140 million dollars worth of contracts were handed out to the immortal trifecta of Gary Matthews Jr, Jeff Suppan and Carlos Silva.  These players have contributed a combined -0.7 WARP in 2009, not exactly bang for one's buck.  All the more shocking, in a world where Kei Igawa is still owed half of his $46 million dollar contract (he was signed for 5 years in December of '06), Soriano's deal may soon stand out as the worst in the sport.  Though many Cubs fans have been disappointed with Soriano's lackluster production during his time with the club, no. 12 has still managed to put up decent numbers, while "leading" his clubs to N.L. Central crowns of the past two seasons.  But now, with Soriano mired in a season-long slump that has seen him--amongst other things--abandon base-stealing, even the most optimistic of bleacher creatures has to be growing concerned about the future.  How's Soriano's $18 million annually going to look after next season, if he continues to post WARP's south of 2.0?  Or in 2014, when the Cubs will be paying as much as 15-20% of their total payroll to the thrity-eight year old?  Is Soriano's decline merely a prolonged statistical aberration, augmented by the stunning extent of his struggles and exacerbated by the neurotic hysteria of his home market?  Or are these the symptoms of physical deterioration, early signs of an apocalyptic degradation in both ability and production for the Cubbie's cornerstone player?  In short, what is Alfonso Soriano worth, and how much return can the Cubs [look forward to(?)] in the future?

Such an assessment requires an understanding of the value--namely the monetary value--of a win, an inherently difficult number to ascertain.  The difficulty lies in the general lack of data available on team revenue; generally teams are operated as small trusts under private ownership, or as part of large conglomerates (such as Anheuser-Busch, STL) in which the team is merely a miniscule portion of a gigantic business.  One exception, cited by Baseball Prospectus, was the Cleveland Indians, who filed financial disclosures with the SEC from 1998 to 2000.  In doing so, the Tribe reported income from eight primary sources: ticket sales, local radio & television contracts, merchandise sales, MLB central fund allocation, concessions & catering revenue, postseason revenue (from 1997), private-suite & seat rental and revenue sharing.  With this data, B.P.'s Nate Silver undertook the unenviable task of extending its learnings to the whole of Major League Baseball; even though Cleveland may have been a model franchise in the late-nineties, it certainly is not representative of the MLB as a whole.  After all, MLB territory includes markets as fanatical and fervent as New York City, and as apathetic and indifferent as Miami; ballparks as beautiful and tantalizing as S.F.'s AT&T Park, and as  decrepit and "derelict" as the H.H.H. Metrodome.  Additionally, every stadium is priced differently, with a different number of luxury suites, and draws its fans from radically different populations (by per-capita income, amongst other things).  Add in a plethora of social factors, past team performance, the well documented "honeymoon effect" associated with new stadiums, etc and you've got a veritable clusterfuck on your hands.

Without delving into the grizzly details of B.P.'s regression analyses (the full description is available on pages 174-196 of B.P.'s "Baseball Between the Numbers," which I would suggest you pick up anyways), and disregarding Silver's "linear model of player valuation," which downplays the observed non-linear bump in revenue a team can expect from earning a postseason bid, I would like to briefly outline the "two-tiered model of player evaluation," as it will be central to the coming discussion.  Accounting for all reported revenue, and deducting revenue-sharing payments, an additional win was shown to be worth approximately $650,000, an additional playoff win, $25 million.  Here's how it broke down categorically--the revenue generated by both a single regular-season win (and a single playoff appearance):

Gate receipts: $700,000 ($14,900,000)

Concessions: $215,000 ($4,500,000)

Luxury suites and club seats: $160,000 ($3,300,000)

Merchandise: $55,000 ($5,800,000)

Local broadcast rights: $0 ($14,100,000)

Playoff gate receipts: $0 ($5,800,000)

- Revenue sharing payments: $385,000 ($14,900,000)

Net: $650,000 ($25,000,000)

While these numbers are nearly a decade old, they are nonetheless useful, especially in light of how little data is actually available on the topic. However one glaring inadequacy in our methodology should be pointed out before we move one: all wins are not created equal.  Using logistic regression analysis, and plotting the number of regular season wins (x) against the probability of that win total earning a team a playoff berth (y), one gets a sigmoid curve (essentially a variation of P(x)=1/(1+e^-x)).  This means that a team (A) with 68 wins has virtually no shot of securing a playoff birth, a team (B) with 98 has virtually no shot of missing the playoffs, and a team (C) with 88-89 wins has essentially a 50-50 shot.  Hypothetically, consider a situation where all three teams sign a free agent who provides a WARP value of 5.0 to replace a player with a WARP of 3.0.  The move has essentially no value to teams A & B, as improving from 68 to 70 wins, or from 98 to 100, has virtually no bearing on the team's playoff odds; team A will still miss the playoffs in every conceivable scenario, just as team B will still be assured of a playoff berth.  Team C, on the other hand, benefits immensely, as improving from 89 wins to 91 improves their playoff odds from 50% to almost 70%.  Thus while teams A & B will gain approximately ~$1.0-1.2 million dollars from their free agent signing in marginal economic value ($500-600K per win), team C can expect returns upwards of $4 million...for a regular season win, nonetheless.  However important this is, a teams can plan for it only to a degree; while the Cubs may have anticipated that an Alfonso Soriano-type player--coupled with a number of pitching upgrades--could vault them into contention in a weak N.L. Central, there is no way to anticipate the competitive balance of a division three, four or eight years down the line.  (Although the Cubs may have won only 66 games in 2006, most recognized it as something of an anomaly, and regarded the Cubs as closer to 'team C' than 'team A.')  Thus knowing that this is a long-term contract, we will evaluate it as such, disregarding marginal economic values in favor of the simple, linear valuation of a regular season win (~$650K). 

Returning to the topic at hand, what does this mean for slump-ridden Alfonso Soriano, GM Jim Hendry (the man who signed off on his 8 year, $136 million contract) and the future prospects of the Chicago Cubs organization?  To begin, let's return to 2004, a year that should have seen Soriano's value plummet in the wake of a [shockingly underpublicized] age scandal.  Shortly after completion of the A-Rod swap, it was revealed that Soriano was 28 years old, not 26 as initially believed.  The Rangers maintained that they were aware of this in advance of the trade, but as it was not grounds for voiding his new contract, whether or not this was damage control will never be known.  What was known, at least by computer programs (such as PECOTA), was that this revelation sullied most of Soriano's accomplishments to date.  Soriano's first extended stint in the major leagues came at age 25, not 23 as originally believed; Soriano may have evolved into a fine player just one season later, posting of WARP of 6.2, but the upside of a 26 year old is markedly different than that of a player two years younger.  (Statistical savant Bill James has written that the peak years of a major league baseball player come between the ages of 25 and 29, with an absolute peak being reached at 27; he has subsequently stated that these numbers are likely over-estimations due to the increased longevities witnessed during the steroids era).  In his age-26 season, PECOTA's top 5 comparisons for Soriano included Ernie Banks, Andre Dawson, Sammy Sosa, George Bell and Juan Samuel.  For a 28 year-old Soriano, the names look a little different: Kelly Gruber, Gene Frese, Max Aviles, Raul Mondesi and (again) Juan Samuel.  Downgrading one's comp from Banks to Mondesi is not exactly flattery, but PECOTA wasn't done: it also predicted WARP's for both a 26 and 28 year-old Soriano going forward:

2004: 5.5 v. 4.9; 2005: 4.5 v. 4.7; 2006: 4.4 v. 3.8; 2007: 4.3 v. 3.6; 2008: 3.7 v. 2.5

Examining his actual WARP performance over the same time period, Soriano has actually stacked up quite favorably (with the exception of 2005).  No. 12's actual WARP's (and the difference between reality and PECOTA's projections) follow:

2004: 4.2 (-0.7), 2005: 1.9 (-2.8), 2006: 7.9 (+4.1), 2007: 6.8 (+3.2), 2008: 4.9 (+2.4)

Soriano has thus underperformed in two seasons and over-performed in three (26.2 actual WARP vs. 19.5 expected, +6.7 net), with two of those having been "legitimate" All-Star caliber efforts.  While this represents a good performance when pitted against PECOTA's projections, WARP's in the 3.0-5.0 range are hardly elite; to the contrary, they are very pedestrian (for instance, Johnny Peralta averaged a 4.55 WARP between '05 and '08).  This season, Arizona ace Dan Haren leads the majors in WARP-1 [the most basic incarnation of the statistic] at 14.3, and Albert Pujols has averaged a 9.4 mark over his nine-year career, while posting a 12.4 in '09.  Additionally, it's hard to ignore the precipitous drop that Soriano has experienced every year following '06, including this season, where Soriano's WARP-1 is a measly 0.9, neck and neck with Angel Pagan and Matt Herges.

Following the 2009 season, Soriano's contract with Chicago will have payed out $41 million dollars.  Assuming the WARP-1 Soriano has posted thus far in '09 holds, he has theoretically accounted for 12.6 additional Cubs wins over a replacement-level player (earning the league-minimum salary of $390,000) during that time period.  The other half of the two-tiered model of player valuation, 'playoff appearance accounted for,' will be deduced by simply subtracting Soriano's WARP outputs from the team's overall W-L each season from '07-'09; if this adjusted W-L record places the Cubs out of the playoff picture, then Soriano will be directly credited with a playoff appearance(*).

2007 (actual): 85-77 (2.0 lead); (sans Soriano): 78-84 (5 GB)*

2008 (actual): 97-64 (7.5 lead); (sans Soriano): 92-69 (2.5 lead)

2009 (actual): 47-45 (2.0 GB); (sans Soriano): 46-46 (3 GB)

2007 is the only year our elementary analysis credits Soriano for impacting the ultimate outcome of the N.L. Central race.  Thus according to the two-tiered model of player valuation, Soriano's value breaks down a follows:

2007

WARP-1: +6.8 (value: $4.420 million)

Playoff Appearance With/Without: Yes/No (value: $25 million)

*Net value: $29.485 million (return: $19.420 million))

2008

WARP-1: +4.9 (value: $3.185 million)

Playoff Appearance With/Without: Y/Y (value: $0)

*Net value: $3.185 million (return: -$10.815 million)

2009

WARP-1: +0.9 (value: $585,000)

Playoff Appearance With/Without (Projected): N/N

*Net value: $585,000 (return: -$16.415 million)

**Net value ('07-'09) [actual - "earned" salary]: $41 - $33.255 million = -$7.745 million

The two-tiered model is admittedly harsh, giving Soriano full credit for the Cubs inspired turnaround in 2007 (culminating in a playoff appearance), while awarding him zero credit for their playoff appearance in 2008.  Nevertheless, this is probably fair, as an '08 Cubs team minus Soriano's contributions would've almost certainly made the playoffs in a feeble N.L. Central; Soriano missed 53 games last season anyways, and the Cubs were above .500 in those games.  This relatively straightforward picture could fast become complicated however.  The possibility exists that the Cubs (currently 2 GB) could end up winning the Central division by a margin less than Soriano's final WARP-1, contingent on his raising this value above one, which he will almost certainly do.  In such a scenario, our assessment of his value markedly changes.  Say the Cubs win the Central crown by one game over the Cardinals, who also finish 2.0 GB of the Colorado in the Wild Card chase and miss the playoffs entirely.  Let us also say that during this time, Soriano doubles his WARP-1, ending the season at 1.8, a value that would currently rank him behind thoroughly underwhelming White Sox 2B Chris Getz.  Under the simplistic system I have chosen to employ, Soriano would get credit for the team's playoff berth, and with it the $25 million of revenue set to come the Cubbie's way; with such a contribution, Soriano would have provided a positive net return on his three-year salary.  Yet it goes without saying that a player who contributes a 1.8 WARP does not deserve such credit, as he has performed at a well below-average level that season.  Concurrently, such a situation would be vastly different from 2007, in which Soriano's All-Star caliber performance propelled the Cubs team to a Central Division title, even though my analysis would assign equal monetary value to each contribution.  In the interest of preserving this system and all its simplicity, a condition requiring a league-average WARP for starting position players (which should settle around +4 most years) may be needed; if the player under examination fails to reach this plateau, he would not be credited with a 'playoff appearance accounted for.'  As of July 23, such a stipulation is not yet necessary, and if there is any justice in the baseball universe it will stay that way (the recently-completed Matt Holliday to St. Louis deal should help).  At the very least it would save me from having to write a second blog post explaining Silver's "market price model" in a desperate attempt to preserve the legitimacy of my point.

Returning to the raw data, it's fair to say that Soriano has underperformed in his three years with Chicago (especially when factoring in his .138 playoff OBP).  Still, the degree to which he has done so is not as vast as one might expect.  This is almost entirely due to Soriano's boarder-line elite performance in 2007, which propelled the Cubs to a division title, albeit with a mere 85 wins.  Take out the $25 million accredited to Soriano for this contribution--or divy it up amongst several key roster components--and Soriano's performance begins to look much, much worse.  In actuality, Soriano has not been horrific, he has merely been average.  And wildly inconsistent.  And often injured.  Yes, he is over-payed, but is that even unique enough to be noteworthy?  Put another way, has Soriano's contract been any worse than, say, Jose Guillen's 3-year, $36 million deal with Kansas City?  The numbers would say no, and they would be correct, as Guillen has thus far provided a net WARP of +0.2 in 233 games with Kansas City (a $130K value, according to our method).  But one key difference remains: Soriano still has five year left after 2009, and will be owed a staggering $18 million in his age-38 season.  The Royals, on the other hand, will have officially washed their hands of Guillen by next November.

Many will point out that Soriano was not signed for his contributions at age 38, he was signed for his ages 31-35 seasons with the hopes that several playoff appearances (and maybe even a championship) later, natural inflation rates of the free-agent market will make the remainder of his contract swallow-able.  This is a good tactic for certain teams at certain times; consider if Roy Halladay was a free-agent this offseason--it certainly would behoove the Phillies to offer Halladay whatever length of contract he desired to get him signed.  This is because the Phils are a team with a core of star players either in (Utley, Howard, Ibanez, Werth, Victorino) or just past (Rollins) their primes, along with a mature ace and a sterling bullpen.  And a fast-closing window; knowing they can perform for only two-to-three more years at an elite level, they should absolutely try to make as many championship runs as they can in that time, especially considering the startling lack of competition for the N.L. pennant.  As was mentioned earlier, when the Cubs signed Soriano, they were riding the septic fumes of a 66 win season--not exactly the same scenario, but if management felt it could fashion a contender while Soriano was still in the latter-part of his prime (which it did), then this argument holds some water.  It would hold a hell of a lot more if the deal had been for five years; anything more than that and the Cubbies would have been better off taking a pass.  Especially since Cubs management was in the position to dictate when their optimum competitive window would be, based on the free agents they signed.  Soriano's signing signalled the immediate switch to a "win now" mentality, and thus necessitated the assemblage of a largely imported team of established big-league players (e.g. Lilly, Harden, Dempster, Fukodome, DeRosa & Bradley).  Now the window appears to be closing, and the hundred million dollar question has become: how will Soriano age?

While there's no perfect answer, an easy approximation can be generated by looking at how similar players have fared after their 34th birthday.  According to baseball-reference.com, the most similar hitter to Alfonso Soriano (by age) is Matt Williams.  The mere fact that we're discussing Matt Williams should bring to light the myriad shortcomings with this line of analysis, nevertheless, Williams delivered a Mike Schmidt performance in his age-33 season, posting a .303/.344/.536 line while banging 35 home runs and driving in 142.  The rest of his career, which spanned four seasons and 306 games, Carson Crusher hit a grand total of 44 home runs, only once exceeding a .315 OBP or driving in more than 50 runs.  But again, Soriano and Williams are of widely divergent playing styles and body types; perhaps a more appropriate comp comes courtesy of PECOTA: Don Baylor.  Baylor logged seven seasons after his 34th (the first four of the "complete" variety), hitting 125 home runs, posting five EqA's over .273 (two over .300) and appearing in two World Series (1986 with Boston, which he lost, and 1987 with Minnesota, which he won).  Despite this, Baylor was hardly a standout player, logging only two seasons--his age-34 & 35 campaigns--with WARP's above 4.0 (5.1 & 4.0 respectively), and ending his career with two seasons of essentially replacement-level productivity.  Also notable, over this time period he logged 723 games as a DH position, playing zero innings in the field these past two seasons; obviously this is a luxury Soriano will not be afforded.  One last point regarding Don, and for those of you who remember Baylor as I do (that is, as a fat DH for the Twins with no remaining knees), this may come as somewhat of a suprise: he once stole 52 bases in a season!  (Soriano's career high, coming in his first full campaign, was only 43.)  But Baylor never again swiped twenty bags after hitting his 30th birthday.  All this is interesting, but what do these comps--and others like them--tell us about Soriano's future prospects?  PECOTA thinks it knows, and you ain't gonna like it (projected WARP's for the remainder of his Cubs contract follow):

(2009: 4.0), 2010: 3.3, 2011: 2.5, 2012: 1.8, 2013: 1.3, 2014: 0.5

Correspondingly, PECOTA offers an estimated "MORP" (marginal value over replacement player) for each of his projected WARP outputs.  The values are generously adjusted for an 8% inflation in player salaries each year, and are listed in millions of dollars:

2010: $6.500; 2011: $4.875; 2012: $3.575; 2013: $2.700; 2014: $1.300

That's $1.3 million dollars of marginal value over a replacement-level player in a season the Cubs will be paying him $18 million...ouch.  In fact, taking the amount of money due to come Soriano's way from 2010-2014 and subtracting from it his MORP, gives a difference of $72.55 million!  That difference represents well over three times the value of Soriano's projected MORP performance; staggering numbers, even ignoring the fact that Soriano is currently undershooting his 2009 WARP projection by 3.1 wins.  Using our more-elementary system, Soriano is worth only $6.11 million over the final five years of his deal.  Adding the $7.745 million dollars in "debt" he has accrued over the deal's first three years to the nearly $89 million in projected "debt" he is expected to over the final five, Soriano will have to deliver four playoff berths (that the Cubs wouldn't otherwise secure) in order to justify his contract.

A lot of people thought that this deal was stupid the day it was signed (myself being one of them), we were just unable to grasp the grandiosity of Hendry's ineptitude until the early returns were in.  And if the Cubs are unable to make a legitimate title push this year, in a weak National League, we haven't even begun to see how ugly this could get.  So lay off Brian Sabean...Barry Zito has a WARP-1 of 0.7 this season, anyways, pretty damn similar to 'Fonso's.  Today, indiscretion has a new name, and its "Hendry."

Manuel Override: Can the Mets Salvage 2009?

Contributor: Athos 

Strange happenin’s all around the baseball world as of late.  Ian Snell has put up a microscopic 0.34 ERA in fours starts for Triple-A Indianapolis; if this currently frustrated righty isn’t a prime candidate to pull a Doyle Alexander down the stretch for some contender, I don’t know who is.  In other news, something called ‘Fu Ye Ni’ currently occupies a space in the Tigers bullpen—still trying to wrap my mind around that one.  And, being as it is now the twentieth of July, Mr. Met needs to start being seriously concerned.  The national media and fans outside of New York City proper, citing the return of Jose Reyes (and the eventual returns of the Carloses, Delgado and Beltran), seem to believe it’s a foregone conclusion that the Mets will be in contention come September.  Equally unsettling, some actually believe Jeff Francoeur (who has actually managed to lower his EqA 32 points from his .229 showing in Atlanta) will prove a positive, nay an essential acquisition in the realization of this fantasy.  If you believe that, I’ve got some ocean front property in Idaho you may be interested in.  This team is earmarked for a middle-of-the-division finish despite what Joe Gariolgio (or whoever runs the sub shop racket in New York) has tricked himself into believing. 

History doesn’t bode well for this bunch.  One would assume that if you run a ballclub that has been repeatedly weak down the stretch, one would shy away from a manager who has been at the forefront of several “Tin Cup-esque” collapses.  That is, unless you happen to be Omar Minaya, in which case this hiring makes perfect sense.  (Fun brain teaser, courtesy of Wally: in a world of pure, unfettered energetics, would the cognitive dissonance Omar Minaya experienced trading for a white player be sufficient to counteract the negative karma from two consecutive epic September collapses?  My vote is YES!)  For years I myself had a front row seat to Jerry Manuel’s managerial struggles when his talented-but-listless White Sox teams spoon-fed AL Central Titles to the Twins.  Thus, if you are Mets management, Jerry Manuel represents everything you don’t want: a staunch baseball traditionalist with a laissez-fair attitude towards his players who served as the top lieutenant to each of the team’s previous two failures (spearheaded by Willie Randolph).  Manuel is only the head of the shit-berg, however. 

  

Let’s talk about Jose Reyes, whose presence the past two Septembers likely hurt the team more than has his prolonged absence this season.  A transcendent talent, Reyes is a legitimate burner on the basepaths who also possesses a stellar defensive skill-set.  And examining the superficial numbers, one would come to the conclusion that Reyes was a more-than-effective player in both '07 and '08.  In those seasons, he’s posted OPS’ of .775 and .833, respectively, from the leadoff spot, and has been above average defensively (1.8 UZR/150), despite some concentration lapses and a disturbing degree of general carelessness.  However, going beyond these numbers we start to see an alarming trend.  During the final months of the last two seasons, Reyes has been downright suspect.  Take for example an interesting stat from the Mets first collapse (2007): Reyes’ fly ball rate.  For the season, the Met shortstop kept it at a fairly reasonable 38 percent, but for September, he boosted it up to 46 percent, easily his highest total for the season; being a leadoff man with fairly limited power, that ratio is downright obscene.  Not only does it indicate a sea change in his plate approach, but it also squanders his most valuable asset, speed (which is best served by keeping the ball on the ground).  Couple his late-season collapses with a well-documented lack of focus, add Citi Fields enormous dimensions and folks, we have problem, even if Reyes does return as expected.  There have long been rumblings behind the scenes in Flushing that Reyes tends to lose interest when the Mets fall behind in the standings, and I can’t believe that a ten game deficit in late July, coupled with a certain “Frenchy” batting fifth, will do much to rev Mr. Reyes’ engine.  I’ve seen it in print a hundred times, “as Reyes goes, so go the Mets.”  If indeed this is true, the rest of the season could be a perfect storm of sorts for a titanic Mets swoon.  With no timetable set for the returns of Delgado and Beltran, is there any hope of reinforcements on the horizon?

  

Short, passively-worded answer: not really.  In recent years the Mets have hinged their future on everything from overrated youngsters (Daniel Murphy, Nick Evans, Jonathan Niese), to hopelessly flawed prospects (Lastings Milledge, Fernando Martinez).  And the truth of the matter is simple: much like the substance-less LA of A system, the Met’s system is downright bad.  So forget about it; Martinez, Niese, Wilmer Florez, Bobby Parnell and others are not saving the Metropolitans…it just ain’t gonna happen.  But this predicament is not a mere prospect problem.  Like a raccoon with Alzheimer’s, Omar Minaya has this pesky habit of diving headfirst into other people’s garbage, even when there’s essentially nothing there to be had.  'What, Marlon Anderson flamed out with the Nationals? Sign him quick, before the Schaumburg Flyers get in on the bidding!'  'Say, what’s that pile of shit those flies are circling around…is Fernando Nieve under there?  Jesus Christ, somebody dig him out...and get him a guarenteed contract, already!'  'Hola, Omar here...Livan Hernandez is on the market you say? Will we take him? Are tacos delicious? ...Of course!' (Fun tidbit: Livan's ERA over his past two starts is 19.29, and batters have hit .568 against him in that stretch!)

  

What’s my point?  This nasty trend just isn’t conducive to winning.  Ask Dan O’Dowd about his early years as Rockies head man; other teams don’t sign these types of players for a reason.  Still, the Wilpon brothers have allowed Minaya to operate like this for quite a while now (1) because the Mets have had the money, and (2) because the stars tend to clean up his messes, at least in the final standings.  But now, with injuries to Beltran, Delgado and others, it has become obvious that this type of season was inevitable; the Mets are a sinking ship, and after they finish with 78 wins they’ll have to do some serious self-examination on every level.  So, Joe at the hoagie shop, enjoy watching another year slip away in the East, and while you’re at it, get on a treadmill you fat guinea greaseball.  Let's hear it for the MIDWEST!

Somebody Get Dayan a Taco

Contributor: Seamus, Wally

I watched the Future's Game--my favorite spectacle of the year--and came away with the following impressions:

    * Mike Stanton looks positively gargantuan...in a good way.  Too bad he really didn't get a chance to swing it, nevertheless, I heard he put on an absolute show in BP (like Justin Morneau circa 2002).

    * Dayan Viciedo looks equally gargantuan...in a fat way.  Is it worse that I now feel 'reaching his ceiling' might mean becoming Eduardo Perez, or that I don't think there's even a chance this kid will ever reach that level?  True, AA was a pretty ambitous assignment for Dayan, but its still hard to overlook that sub-.400 SLG.  Hope I'm wrong.

    * Speaking of which, kudos to the White Sox prospects for making the game's only errors, including one on the game's first play by Mr. Tyler Flowers.  On the bright side, they each collected hits, in Viciedo's case, a pivotal double in the seventh and final inning.  Back to business...

    * Tyson Gillies looks like Michael Johnson.  But with some serious skills; the kid can handle the bat and looks to have above average defensive tools to boot...I would have liked to have seen him in center.  Additionally, the hearing aid story did not, nor under any circumstances should it have, [brought] tears to Rick Sutcliffe's eyes.

    * Neftali Feliz looks like a closer.  His fastball is one of the best in all of baseball (major league, minor league, Japanese major league...whatever), though I wonder how well he will ever command it.  It will certainly take a while before he can command his breaking stuff, but in a relief role (which he has recently assumed for the AAA Roughriders, at least temporarily) this won't be such a big deal.  He pitches like the lovechild of Carlos Marmol and Ubaldo Jimenez, and frankly I could see his career playing out either way.  Nevertheless, my gut tells me closer as of now.  That would be exceedingly unfortunate for Texas, who at least needs to try him as a starter...young dynamos with the ability to maintain their velocity late into games are a rare commodity, and they should all be tried in the rotation before being relegated to relief duty.

    * My favorite prospect in all of baseball, Buster Posey (SF), was absent from the event, due to the rule limiting each team to a maximum contribution of two players.  Following World Team 1B Yonder Alonso's injury, the Giants were essentially forced to send Angel Villalona to the game along with Madison Bumgarner, the top pitching prospect in the minor leagues.  (Mad Bum didn't get the chance to throw however; as he was warming up, a four-hour rain delay halted festivities.  Half an hour after the tarp was pulled over the field, there was zero chance of Bumgarner getting back up.)  The ramifications of including Villalona on the World roster extended beyond the exclusion of Posey (who I believe to be a better catching prospect than fellow A-listers Carlos Santana and Jesus Montero, the latter of whom will likely move out from behind the plate before reaching the bigs).  Likewise, Tim Alderson, an elite prospect in his own right, was nowhere to be seen.  Ditto for Texas wunderkid Justin Smoak, though for different reasons (nursing an injury, the BA selection committee left him off, not wanting to deal with the circus of producing a last-minute replacement should he withdraw).  Pity.

    * Jason Heyward could well grow into a more-athletic Jermaine Dye, a much better comp than most would credit it as.  He, along with Stanton, is a gigantic human being, a statement that holds true even though he currently lacks his full repertoire of "man muscles," a term I was unfamiliar with until last week, when I saw it in print a staggering three times!  He has assumed Weiter's vacated throne as the top prospect in all of baseball.

    * Ranking the top pitching performances, from most-to-least promising as it pertains to their big-league careers: Neftali Feliz, Chris Tillman (despite the less-than stellar results), Matt Latos, Kyle Drabek, Casey Kelly, Jhoulys Chacin, Brad Lincoln.

In other news, the future of the White Sox, Gordon Beckham, had another two hits last night, pushing his season average to .281.  He's fast becoming my favorite player on the White Sox, and has a chance at becoming a legitimate big league star once (a) he is given a permanent positional assignment (my guess would be second; his finer attributes as a defender are being squandered at third, where he's looked lost at times) and (b) starts driving the ball (remember that just over one year ago he was still using a metal bat; the power will come).

Also, has anyone else noticed that the Hawk has started to double dip on the YESSS proclamation following every home run?  It works in certain contexts--like when Paulie jacks his third bomb of the night, or Thome hits a go-ahead grand slam to log his fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh RBI of the evening--the rest of the time it just feels like a bit of DJ withdrawal (current broadcast partner Steve Stone has thus far resisted the temptation to join in the iconic call).  Hang in there Ken; and by the way, that "You can put it on the board...YESSS...HELL YESSS" you dropped on us the other night was f*cking awesome.  Almost as awesome as President Obama Barack'n the Sox Starter jacket out to the mound in St. Louis.  Go Sox.

Rumblings also have Chicago looking to move a big contract or two.  Question is, do the White Sox want to unload payroll while still (a) selling [relatively] high and (b) improving their ballclub, possibly even in the short term?  Paul Konerko and Jim Thome don't have enough value to command a prospect yield worthy of their still-formidable skill sets and Jermaine Dye is far too good to give up.  So don't even think about that, even with the return of Carlos Quentin on the imminent horizon.  The guy who should go is Bobby Jenks.  And soon.  The ERA+'s of Thornton (152), Linebrink (149), Dotel (140), Carrasco (130), Poreda (188) and Pena (153 with ARI) suggest the Sox will be just fine without Jenks (120).  Some club (Tampa Bay, Chicago (NL), Texas) must need an elite reliever, and [foolishly] believe that Jenks still fits that bill...right?

Is This the Same Howie Kendrick I Was Promised Would Win Multiple Batting Titles?

Contributor: Bombykol

Certain conjectures in baseball seem to arise more often than is logically explainable.  Such as this doosie, which any casual follower of the prospect scene has been privy to at least a half dozen times: "Howie Kendrick is going to win multiple batting titles by the time his career is finished."  Really?  Kendrick has posted a .227/.267/.350 this year, and there's been talk of his demotion to Triple-A Salt Lake, with Pacific Coast League HR leader Sean Rodriguez slated to take his place.  Multiple batting titles?  That's happened thirty-eight times; here's the list: Nap Lajoie, Cap Anson, Bill Duffy, Big Ed Delhanty, Honus Wagner, Jack Daugbert, Ty Cobb, George Sisler, Paul Waner, Harry Heilman, Jimmie Foxx, Rogers Hornsby, Lefy O'Douhl, Luke Appling, Joe Dimaggio, Stan Musial, Mickey Vernon, Ferris Faine, Ted Williams, Hank Aaron, Pete Rose, Roberto Clemente, Tommy Davis, Phil Runnels, Bill Madlock, Tony Oliva, Dave Parker, Rob Carew, Carl Yastrzyemski, George Brett, Wade Boggs, Tony Gwynn, Larry Walker, Edgar Martinez, Nomar Garciaparra, Barry Bonds, Ichiro Suzuki and Joe Mauer.  Next up, Howie Kendrick?  What evidence do you have to support such a bold claim?

One commonly cited argument is that Kendrick absolutely destroyed minor league pitching over a 379 career game MiLB career; in fact, the argument can be made that Kendrick enjoyed one of the most prolific minor-league careers ever (extended stints highlighted below):

  

Adv-R ('03):    .368/.434/.517 (63 G)

Lo-A ('04):      .367/.391/.569 (75 G)

Hi-A/AA ('05): .367/.406/.614 (109 G, 63/46)

AAA ('06):       .369/.408/.631 (69 G)

  

Kendrick spent quite a while in the pipeline, though to be fair, his extensive time of languish is partly organizational (see: Wood, Brandon)--most players do not need to post four consecutive seasons of .365+ BA to land in the majors.  Then again, when you're being blocked by the force of nature that is Adam Kennedy, all bets are off.  Kidding aside, Kendrick's farm club credentials are extraordinary, especially considering that they include a career OBP above .400 (.401) and a career slugging above .550 (.571), two plateaus that seem all-but-unreachable for Howie the big leaguer.

  

Yes, the majors have indeed been a vastly different story for Kendrick, and it hasn't all been attributable to injuries.  First, let's acknowledge the blatantly obvious: Kendrick doesn't possess much in the way of plate discipline.  Check out his base-on-ball and strikeout percentages in 2009, and over his three-year ML career:

  

BB%: 3.6% (2009); 3.2% (career)

 

K%: 17.6% (2009); 20.0% (career)

  

Vladimir Guerrero has a career BB% of 9.1%, Ivan Rodriguez of 5.1%, Jeff Francouer of 4.9% and Yuniesky Betancourt of 3.2%.  Of these notorious free-swingers, only Francouer has a K% nearing 20% (19.6% career). Needless to say, this is not good, as Francouer is a career .254 EqA hitter, a slightly below average figure when considering all ML players, and a well below average one for a starter at the premium offensive position of RF.

  

Taking Vladimir Guerrero as our case study in productive free-swinging (and branding Francouer our poster-boy for hacker inadequacy), let's see how Kendrick stacks up.  For any free swinger, it is imperative to consider how they fare when offering at pitches outside of the zone (note: the statistics we will be concerned with are denoted by an O- prefix for 'outside the zone').  As swinging at would-be balls is the M.O. of a hacker, we would expect Kendrick's O-Swing% to be well above the league average of ~25%.  Indeed it is, by a formidable 12.2% over the course of his career.  As you can see, Guerrero and Francouer stack up similarly:

  

Career O-Swing%: 37.2% (Kendrick), 38.1% (Guerrero), 36.4% (Francouer)

  

Likewise, we might expect his O-Contact% to be at-or-above the league average of ~60% if he is to beat all justified in his ~40% O-Swing%.  However, an important caveat exists in this regard, which explains why increasing the number of attempts may actually lower the contact percentage, even for a proficient free-swinger.  Many batters elect to expand the strike zone primarily to attack the proverbial "hanger," blatant mistake pitches that even a disciplined hitter may view as advantageous to offer at.  As such, we can forgive Kendrick's O-Swing% for sitting slightly-below league average for his career, though he is toeing the lower precipice of what can be considered acceptable.  Guerrero, on the other hand, is well above 60%, and sits over ten percentage points higher than his teammate Kendrick for their respective careers:

  

O-Contact%: 53.5% (career), 64.9% (Guerrero), 56.8% (Francouer)

  

This is more of a nod to Guerrero's transcendent hitting chops than it is a brazen indictment of Kendrick; Vlad, needless to say, simply occupies another plane of bad-ball adeptness.  Still, all is not well for our boy Howie, as his performance on pitches out of the strike-zone nearly mirrors that of Francouer.

  

Extending the Francouer comparison further, the Braves right fielder has posted a 1.18 GB/FB ratio over the course of his career, ironically, an identical figure to that posted by Twins catcher and two-time batting champion Joe Mauer.  Kendrick, on the other hand, is sporting a career ratio of 1.85 (1.89 in '09), placing him closer to Ichiro (2.35 career) and Juan Pierre (2.49) than Joltin' Joey.  (For some additional perspective, Joey Gathright has a career GB/FB ration of 4.46, Adam Dunn of 0.72.)  This is notable because Kendrick is a line-drive oriented hitter (20.0% LD% career) who is seemingly at his best when squaring up the ball and shooting liners to all fields.  He is simply not, and will never be, a slap-and-dash type who amasses IF hits with pure foot speed.  Additionally, Kendrick BABIP on ground balls has been within .001 of his career .246 mark each of the past three years, neither a terrible nor an aberrational number, but not overly encouraging for someone hitting as many grounders as Howie.

  

All of these statistics that I've thrown at you are not meant to suggest that Kendrick can never be a .300 hitter (on the contrary, I expect him to hit at or above .300 most years), or that Jeff Francouer is somehow closer to a batting title than him.  Rather, it simply indicates that Kendrick would be well served to put the ball in the air more often; if he were to do so, the comparisons with Francouer would quickly cease.  Again however, a caveat is necessary.  According to a very interesting article on FanGraphs.com, the 'line-drive rate' in Angel Stadium is a mere 0.84 (with 1.00 being league-average for the number of batted balls coded as line-drives).  This means a line-drive is 14% tougher to hit in Angels stadium than in, say, Yankee Stadium (1.00).  (note: In fairness to our comp, Mr. Francouer, his home park of Turner Field is sporting a line-drive average of only 0.86 itself.)  The reasoning behind this low figure is difficult to ascertain, but Southern California's air/weather conditions along with a degree of scoring bias is more-than-likely to blame.

  

Even if he does develop into a .300 hitter, Kendrick is going to need to be extremely fortunate (see: Mueller, Bill; .328 in '03) if he is going to win a batting title with his current (career) peripherals.  But forget batting titles--this season, Kendrick has been terrible at the dish, a negative VORP guy, and thus a detriment to his team.  However, he is certainly not as bad a hitter as he has shown.  What is to blame?  Consider the following data:

  

BABIP: .346 (career); .329 (2006), .382 (2007), .362 (2008), .258 (2009)

  

...which more or less speaks for itself.  But to understand what ails Howie, we need to go deeper.  How are we to explain a BABIP that is 88 points below his career average; can it all be purely chance?  Short answer: no.  His BABIP in '09 is not a black box, and can be explained in a variety of ways, none of which by itself represents a decisive answer.  The first way is to write-off his career average as a tad high, perhaps by as many as 20 points (over what he can expect for his career).  For comparison, Vlad Guerrero has posted a .322 BABIP over a much larger sample size, not uncommon for an elite hitter.  Year-to-year fluctuations are to be expected, but still, .258!?  Even in an off-year, this is still 10 to 15 points below what we would expect for Kendrick.  Have pitchers simply begun to adjust?  The numbers suggest that Kendrick is seeing approximately the same distribution of pitches this year as he has in any other, perhaps slightly more fastballs, but heaters have never given Kendrick any problems; to simplify:

  

Off-Speed% ((CB+SL+CU+XX)/TOTAL): 40.2% (career), 37.3 (2009)

  

What he has been able to do with just about any pitch, however, has changed markedly in 2009.  Aside from the aforementioned 57.8 GB% (which is about 10% higher than would be considered 'ideal'; Guerrero, 44.3% career), Kendrick's line drives are also way down.  As Kendrick has played in Angel Stadium his entire career, the absolute percentages may be slightly misleading, but the relative percentages are startling, nonetheless:

  

LD%: 12.5% (2009), 20.0% (2008), 15.9% (career)

  

A one year drop-off of 7.5% is really quite puzzling, and a 12.5% mark for the year is downright discouraging, as ~20% is the mark of a vey good-to-elite hitter.  If forced to pick one statistic that sums up Kendrick's struggles in 2009, LD% would be at or near the top of the list.  It is hard to maintain a BABIP when one's line drive percentage takes such a major hit; grounders and fly balls simply don't find as much open real estate as liners.

  

Kendrick has been snowballing in recent weeks, and as his numbers continue to decline, his already pedestrian defense has suffered as well.  It's hard to prescribe a minor-league stint for him, as well, as he has nothing left for him to accomplish the MiL level; to compound this, anything less than a resounding success could be potentially demoralizing, as Kendrick has experienced only prodigious productivity at all minor league stops.  Perhaps the best thing for both Howie and the Angles is just to allow him to hack his way through this tough patch (or hold out until he inevitably injures himself), hoping that the other bats around him show some signs of life (for instance, off-season acquisition Abreu (picked up, for all intensive purposes, instead of ManRam), has one measly homer and a .382 SLG through 47 G).  One way to stimulate the lineup: promote Brandon Wood and give him some g*ddamn AB's.  Erick Aybar (.279/.309./.395) and Maicer Izturis (.262/.301/.291), who at one point batted third this season...with a .291 SLG...batted in the three-hole...with a .233 EqA...THIRD, IN A F*CKING MAJOR LEAGUE LINEUP...is Mike Scioscia just toying with Angels' mgmt, seeing how much ridiculous bullshit he can pass as "strategy" before he gets fired!?!?

  

Returning to the topic at hand (though it's unfortunate that my runaway thought trains are incapable of pulverizing the gigantic ignoramus that is LA of A's manager): Erick Aybar and Maicer Izturis are not quality major league shortstops.  Brandon Wood, on the other hand, who has yet to get hot in the Triple-A PCL, is still posting a .288/.365/.576 through 37 games, and thus should constitute a major offensive improvement given the opportunity.  Wood, a notrious streak hitter, has never been given enough AB's at the big league level to truly show what he can do.  Because his manager is a stubborn, antiquated jackass, plain and simple.  Wood and his career MiL SLG of .894, can most certainly help the offensively anemic Angels at short or third (3B Figgins, EqA of .270, after a blisteringly hot 17-game stretch).  Once he is allowed to get in a groove, the characteristic hot streak that will inevitably ensue might be able to mask the ineptitude of the Angels other hitters, or at least take enough pressure off Kendrick so that he may resume his ascent towards adroit hacking before '09 is lost for good.